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Abstract  
The main objective of this paper is to study the impact of monetary policy 
decisions on the lending rates of commercial banks in Morocco. For this purpose, 
A Vector Auto regressive (VAR) model is estimated in order to measure the 
impact of policy rate variations on the commercial lending rates, namely: treasury 
rate, consumer credit rate, equipment rate and mortgage rate. The main empirical 
finding is that variations in policy rate impacts the rates of commercial bank and 
the effect is more important on the short run than on the longer run rates. 
 
Keywords: Monetary policy, Interest rate channel, VAR, Impulse response 
functions  
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INTRODUCTION 
Monetary policy refers to the actions undertaken by the Central Bank to influence 
monetary and financial variables such as interest rates, money and credit, which 
in turn affect the economic behavior of households and firms. The aim is to 
influence the final demand components during the short run. In the long run, the 
monetary policy has no impact as the supply conditions drives the economy and 
the influence of money is only on price level.  
The money supply is mainly the role of commercial banks through loans 
operations. However, their money supply power is limited because of the 
structural need of high-powered money (M0) that are the notes and coin (demand 
from costumers) and the bank’s deposits at the central bank (operation in the 
money market). Each time the commercial banks need to be refinanced in high 
powered money, they address their demand to the central bank that has the 
supply monopoly of M0.  
The central Bank chooses the price (interest rate) at which it will lend high-
powered money to commercial banks. This is the official rate that will ensure, all 
things being equal, the objective of the central bank that is price stability (and 
economic growth for some central banks). Thus, the interest rate in the money 
market must stay around the official rate. To insure this linkage between the 
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official and the money market rate, the central bank can use various instruments 
such as Automatic facilities, Open market, FX interventions and Minimum 
reserves. 
Graph 1: Rates in the Moroccan money market 
 
Source: quarterly report Bank Al-Maghrib 
Once this operational objective is achieved, the question is to see if the targeted 
final1 objectives are (or will be) reached. At this point intervene the concept of 
“monetary policy transmission channels”. These channels describe how monetary 
policy decisions, affecting the interest rate and / or the amount of money in 
circulation, affect real variables such as production and consumption. 
Following the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (2000), the 
transmission of monetary policy can be represented as follow: 
                                                 
1 Some central banks target intermediate objectives such as exchange rate or money growth rate, 
these indicators help the central bank to achieve its final objective of price stability.  
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Figure 1: Transmission channels for monetary policy 
 
Source: Bank of England 
The variations of the official rate will affects immediately the money market rate 
which will impact, other things being equals, in his turn the short run interest 
rates. The impact on longer-term interest rates however is more uncertain 
because they are influenced by the current and expected level of short term 
interest rates and inflation expectations.  
Changes in rates also affect the price of financial assets such as bonds and 
equities. Following the Tobin Q (Tobin, 1969), there is a negative relationship 
between the price of bonds and the long-term interest rate; a rise in long-term 
interest rates lowers bond prices, and vice versa. Higher interest rates also 
automatically lower other securities prices because expected future returns are 
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discounted by a greater interest rate, so the present value of any given future 
income falls.  
The exchange rate is the relative price of domestic and foreign currency. In an 
open economy with a flexible exchange rate, the transmission of interest rate 
variations to the exchange rate is ensured through the uncovered interest rate 
parity (UIP).  Following the UIP, the difference in interest rates between two 
countries is equal to the expected change in exchange rates between the 
countries' currencies. If this parity does not exist, there is an opportunity to make 
a risk-free profit using arbitrage techniques. Thus, a fall in the domestic interest 
rate relative to the foreign rate reduces the attractiveness of deposits in the 
national currency and leads to a depreciation of the currency. This depreciation 
will impacts external trade and consequently final demand and inflation. 
The central bank can also influence expectations of economic agents about the 
future to achieve his objectives (price stability). Through this channel, the Central 
Bank can reduce the cost of its interventions because the transmission of 
monetary policy decisions is made through the influence of central bank 
announcements on economic agents. If the announcement (about inflation, 
growth, exchange rate…) is considered credible, transactions will be based on it 
before decisions are actually implemented and, at the end of the process, the 
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central bank will achieve its objectives without making effective monetary policy 
decisions.  
The necessary conditions for the effectiveness of this channel are the 
independence of the Central Bank and the inter-temporal credibility of its 
monetary policy decisions (Bennouna, Lahlou, Mossadak, 2016).  
All these channels leads to a change in total demand (domestic, i.e Investment 
and consumption) and external net demand (export-import) and external prices. 
The variations of demand and external prices will impact the level output and 
inflation in the short term. 
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOROCCAN MONETARY POLICY 
FRAMEWORK 
The effectiveness of monetary policy transmission in any country depends 
essentially on its economic structure. In this section we present the main 
characteristics of the macroeconomic framework that may influence the 
implementation of monetary policy in Morocco.   
Morocco adopts a fixed exchange regime (fixed parity, 60% euro and 40% 
dollars), carries out most of its foreign trade with the Eurozone and devoted 
subsidies to energetic products (This was the case until 2014, after that the price 
of fuels is indexed to international market and the subsidies concern only cooking 
gas and a few number of basic products).  
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Graph 2: Evolution of inflation in Morocco, US and Euro Zone 
 
Source: IMF (WEO) and Eurostat, author’s calculations 
During the 2010-2014 period, where the oil price reached historical levels, the 
energy subsidies helped considerably to maintain inflation at a controlled level, 
but deteriorates dramatically the situation of public finances. 
Graph 3: Evolution of oil price ($) subsidies, and fiscal deficit (%) during the 
period 2003-2016 
 
Source: ministry of finance, author’s calculation 
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As it’s shown by the chinn-Ito index, the morrocan capital account is almost 
closed. This charcterestic indicates that the evolutions in international capital 
markets have a moderate impact on domestic financial developments.   
Graph 4: Chinn Ito index (2015) for a panel of countries 
 
Source: Chinn-Ito data base, author’s calculations 
According to the impossible trinity, these characteristics imply that the major 
reason of the low Moroccan inflation is the low “imported” inflation from the 
Eurozone (main commercial partner) as the main objective of the European 
Central Bank is to keep inflation below 2%. However, because of the low financial 
openness, Moroccan authorities can have some autonomy in conducting 
monetary policy. 
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Figure 2 The impossible trinity 
 
Source: Mundell, R. (1962) 
Concerning the structure of the financial market, the banking system appears 
very developed in comparison with financial market.  
Graph 5: Number of companies listed in the stock exchange by country (2016) 
 
Source: The World Bank 
In fact, there is less than 80 firms that are listed in the Moroccan stock market. 
This number is very low in comparison of other developing countries. Concerning 
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the banking sector, morocco is well ranked as the credits of the banking sector 
represent more than 65% of GDP.  
Graph 6: Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) 
 
Source: The World Bank 
All the characteristics of the Moroccan economy indicate that the credit channel 
could play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy. This 
transmission is possible if the variation of the official rate are transmitted to the 
medium and long term rates. In the following sections we will try verify this 
supposition empirically. 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to study the transmission from short to long run interest rates, we 
estimate a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model and analyze the response of 
commercial banks interest rates to the variations of the money market rate as we 
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consider that the transmission from the official rate to the money market rate 
(TMP) is given (see Graph 1).  
Graph 7: Evolution of interest rates (2006-2016) 
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The VAR model is as follow: 
ttt
uXLAX  1)(  
With ]',,,,[ TMPTRCRERMRX
t
  a vector of endogenous variables in 
first differences to work with stationary variables as the variables in level are 
integred of order 1. MR is the mortgage rate, ER the equipment rate, CR the 
consumer rate, TR the treasury rate and the TMP the money market rate. )(LA is 
a matrix of coefficients and tu is a vector of errors. 
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The ordering of the variables follows a Cholesky decomposition which imposes, 
during the identification of the impulse responses, a lower triangular matrix and 
consequently a disposition of the variables going from the most endogenous to 
the most exogenous variable (Berkelmans, 2005). 
 
We suppose that the degree of endogeneity is a function of time. It reflects the 
fact that the central bank has the capacity to influence interest rates in the short 
term more than the longer terms which depend on other macroeconomic 
variables such as anticipation of inflation. The used data are quarterly covering 
the period from Q2-2006 to Q4-2016. 
After estimating the VAR model, we analyze the causality between the money 
market rate and the commercial banks’ lending rates using the Granger causality 
test. This test uses past information of a variable x to explain the current value of 
a variable y. If past information is useful to explain y, x is said to Granger causes 
y.  
ESTIMATIONS AND RESULTS 
The accumulated impulse responses (see appendix for more details about the 
estimation) indicate that an increase of the money market rate is transmitted to 
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the all the interest rates.  In fact, a 1% increase in the money market rate implies 
approximately an increase between 1.4% and 0.2% in the commercial rates. The 
change is essentially transmitted during the first 5 quarters following the 
monetary policy decision. 
Graph 8: Accumulated responses of the variables to a shock of 1% in the official 
money market rate (TMP) 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Accumulated Response of DCT to DTMP
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Accumulated Response of DCC to DTMP
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Accumulated Response of DCE to DTMP
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Accumulated Response of DCM to DTMP
 Source: author’s calculation 
 
 14 
Approximately after 8 quarters the final impact of 1% shock to money rate is an 
increase of 1.4%, 0.2%, 0.5% and 0.6% respectively in treasury, consumer, 
equipment and mortgage rates.  
The results of the Granger causality test are in favor of the previous result. Two 
times out of four the causality is going from the money market rate to longer term 
interest rates, especially to treasury rate and consumer rate, the causality is not 
significant for mortgage and equipment rate. In fact, these rates concern long 
term operations which are impacted by other factors such as inflation 
expectations and return on investment.                            
Table 1: Granger causality analysis 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DCT does not Granger Cause DTMP  39  1.90769 0.1482 
 DTMP does not Granger Cause DCT  2.75428 0.0586 
    
     DCM does not Granger Cause DTMP  39  4.04311 0.1052 
 DTMP does not Granger Cause DCM  1.86300 0.1557 
    
     DCE does not Granger Cause DTMP  39  2.16752 0.1111 
 DTMP does not Granger Cause DCE  1.45704 0.2447 
    
     DCC does not Granger Cause DTMP  39  10.8243 5.E-05 
 DTMP does not Granger Cause DCC  3.54542 0.0253 
    
    Source: author’s calculation 
These findings indicate that the central bank has a real power to influence the 
commercial bank interest rates.  
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It should be noted that the analysis is valid when there is an increase and not a 
decrease in the official rate. The VAR model is linear and one can be attempted 
to only reverse the signs to conclude for the result when there is cut in interest 
rate. However, the degree of competitiveness in the Morocco banking sector let 
us think that the result could differ considerably.  
Graph9:  Banking concentration according to Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
Total assets Deposits Loans
 
Source:  Bank Al-Maghrib 
As shown by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the concentration in the banking 
sector is equal to 0.17 which indicates the existence of a moderate concentration. 
Also, the table below indicates that the first 5 banks hold 81% of total loans in the 
Moroccan credit market.   
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Table 2: Change in the credit concentration on a consolidated basis (in %) 
 Total loans 
 2013 2014 2015 
First 3 banking groups 65 65 65 
First 5 banking groups 81 82 81 
Source: Bank Al-Maghrib 
CONCLUSION 
The present study investigated the transmission of monetary policy decisions 
impacting the official rate to the lending rates that the commercial banks use in 
their operation with costumers. The analysis was performed thought a VAR 
model and the examination of causality between the official rate and the lending 
rates using the Granger causality test. 
The accumulated impulse responses indicate that an increase of the money 
market rate is transmitted to the all the interest rates. In fact, a 1% increase in the 
money market rate implies approximately an increase between 1.4% and 0.2% in 
the commercial rates. The results of the Granger causality test are in favor of the 
previous result. In fact, two times out of four the causality is going from the 
money market rate to longer term interest rates and not into the opposite 
direction. These results indicate that the central bank has a real power to 
influence the commercial banks interest rates when there is a tightening in 
monetary conditions.  
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APPENDIX 
 
VAR stability test: 
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Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
 
 
 
Normality test of residuals: 
 
 
VAR Residual Normality Tests   
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)  
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
     
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1 -0.380826  0.942685 1  0.3316 
2  0.182628  0.216795 1  0.6415 
3 -0.149135  0.144568 1  0.7038 
4  0.283234  0.521441 1  0.4702 
5 -0.072026  0.033720 1  0.8543 
     
     
 
 20 
Joint   1.859208 5  0.8683 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  2.992667  8.74E-05 1  0.9925 
2  2.218368  0.992791 1  0.3191 
3  2.529455  0.359795 1  0.5486 
4  2.238176  0.943111 1  0.3315 
5  3.279238  0.126707 1  0.7219 
     
     Joint   2.422491 5  0.7881 
     
          
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  0.942772 2  0.6241  
2  1.209585 2  0.5462  
3  0.504362 2  0.7771  
4  1.464551 2  0.4808  
5  0.160427 2  0.9229  
     
     Joint  4.281699 10  0.9337  
     
     
     
 
Residual correlation test 
 
 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  31.25584  0.1807 
2  24.06833  0.5154 
3  26.42756  0.3851 
4  28.73553  0.2751 
   
   
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
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VAR estimation output: 
 
 
      
       DTMP DCT DCC DCE DCM 
      
      DTMP(-1) -0.026868  1.201228 -0.369921 -0.291967 -0.180406 
  (0.16378)  (0.51107)  (0.25414)  (0.54374)  (0.27074) 
 [-0.16405] [ 2.35041] [-1.45557] [-0.53696] [-0.66634] 
      
DTMP(-2)  0.067400  0.043734  0.148708  1.320502  0.609458 
  (0.14145)  (0.44139)  (0.21949)  (0.46960)  (0.23383) 
 [ 0.47650] [ 0.09908] [ 0.67751] [ 2.81196] [ 2.60643] 
      
DTMP(-3) -0.015270  0.649710 -0.114982 -0.200884 -0.603489 
  (0.12875)  (0.40177)  (0.19979)  (0.42745)  (0.21284) 
 [-0.11861] [ 1.61713] [-0.57553] [-0.46996] [-2.83544] 
      
DCT(-1)  0.038026 -0.694661  0.191471  0.062135  0.126566 
  (0.05985)  (0.18677)  (0.09287)  (0.19870)  (0.09894) 
 [ 0.63535] [-3.71939] [ 2.06163] [ 0.31270] [ 1.27921] 
      
DCT(-2)  0.045769 -0.355741 -0.128759 -0.115495  0.184908 
  (0.07028)  (0.21930)  (0.10905)  (0.23332)  (0.11618) 
 [ 0.65127] [-1.62216] [-1.18071] [-0.49501] [ 1.59162] 
      
DCT(-3)  0.149281 -0.224608  0.089636  0.241262  0.259047 
  (0.05850)  (0.18257)  (0.09078)  (0.19423)  (0.09671) 
 [ 2.55161] [-1.23029] [ 0.98735] [ 1.24212] [ 2.67846] 
      
DCC(-1) -0.196221  0.166940  0.273768  0.569618  0.502776 
  (0.11697)  (0.36502)  (0.18151)  (0.38835)  (0.19337) 
 [-1.67747] [ 0.45734] [ 1.50824] [ 1.46675] [ 2.60004] 
      
DCC(-2) -0.399609 -0.038523 -0.685747 -0.312331 -0.677408 
  (0.11901)  (0.37138)  (0.18467)  (0.39511)  (0.19674) 
 [-3.35778] [-0.10373] [-3.71328] [-0.79049] [-3.44320] 
      
DCC(-3)  0.170205 -0.264516  0.353666  1.005832  0.163276 
  (0.09674)  (0.30189)  (0.15012)  (0.32118)  (0.15993) 
 [ 1.75937] [-0.87621] [ 2.35590] [ 3.13167] [ 1.02095] 
      
DCE(-1) -0.052769  0.141040  0.153119 -0.648628  0.221945 
  (0.05091)  (0.15888)  (0.07901)  (0.16904)  (0.08417) 
 [-1.03642] [ 0.88770] [ 1.93804] [-3.83719] [ 2.63690] 
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DCE(-2) -0.154469  0.486505  0.072771 -0.358980  0.105835 
  (0.06455)  (0.20143)  (0.10016)  (0.21430)  (0.10671) 
 [-2.39305] [ 2.41528] [ 0.72652] [-1.67511] [ 0.99183] 
      
DCE(-3) -0.114442  0.290157 -0.012277 -0.176478 -0.052852 
  (0.05280)  (0.16477)  (0.08193)  (0.17530)  (0.08729) 
 [-2.16744] [ 1.76102] [-0.14985] [-1.00674] [-0.60551] 
      
DCM(-1)  0.166071 -0.313079  0.447079  0.321534 -0.340297 
  (0.09810)  (0.30613)  (0.15223)  (0.32569)  (0.16217) 
 [ 1.69286] [-1.02271] [ 2.93690] [ 0.98723] [-2.09836] 
      
DCM(-2)  0.066985 -0.133052 -0.105987 -0.109748  0.164020 
  (0.10790)  (0.33672)  (0.16744)  (0.35824)  (0.17838) 
 [ 0.62079] [-0.39514] [-0.63299] [-0.30636] [ 0.91952] 
      
DCM(-3)  0.278616  0.358717  0.231414 -0.222219  0.281597 
  (0.09195)  (0.28692)  (0.14268)  (0.30526)  (0.15200) 
 [ 3.03019] [ 1.25021] [ 1.62192] [-0.72796] [ 1.85262] 
      
C -0.044215 -0.008118 -0.022680 -0.010557  0.028327 
  (0.01982)  (0.06184)  (0.03075)  (0.06579)  (0.03276) 
 [-2.23109] [-0.13128] [-0.73751] [-0.16046] [ 0.86465] 
      
       R-squared  0.743965  0.684874  0.773641  0.609778  0.702577 
 Adj. R-squared  0.576986  0.479358  0.626016  0.355285  0.508605 
 Sum sq. resids  0.212510  2.069386  0.511712  2.342362  0.580751 
 S.E. equation  0.096123  0.299955  0.149159  0.319127  0.158903 
 F-statistic  4.455432  3.332451  5.240575  2.396051  3.622060 
 Log likelihood  46.30176  1.919438  29.16570 -0.496767  26.69778 
 Akaike AIC -1.553936  0.722080 -0.675164  0.845988 -0.548604 
 Schwarz SC -0.871449  1.404567  0.007322  1.528475  0.133883 
 Mean dependent -0.018487 -0.023439 -0.047956 -0.044373 -0.012582 
 S.D. dependent  0.147791  0.415707  0.243906  0.397447  0.226681 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  3.13E-08    
 Determinant resid covariance  2.23E-09    
 Log likelihood  111.7451    
 Akaike information criterion -1.627954    
 Schwarz criterion  1.784480    
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